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Abstract
Preserving the privacy of individual databases when carrying out statistical calculations has
a long history in statistics and had been the focus of much recent attention in machine learning
In this paper, we present a protocol for computing logistic regression when the data are held by
separate parties without actually combining information sources by exploiting results from the
literature on multi-party secure computation. We provide only the final result of the calculation
compared with other methods that share intermediate values and thus present an opportunity
for compromise of values in the combined database. Our paper has two themes: (1) the de-
velopment of a secure protocol for computing the logistic parameters, and a demonstration of
its performances in practice, and (2) and amended protocol that speeds up the computation of
the logistic function. We illustrate the nature of the calculations and their accuracy using an
extract of data from the Current Population Survey divided between two parties.
Keywords: Distributed analysis; Logistic regression; Privacy-preserving computation; Se-
cure multiparty computation.
1 Introduction
Privacy concerns are becoming more and more acute, especially in the digitized world where new
supercomputers with an increasing processing capacities appear almost every day. These new
machines together with impressive new technologies make the process of data collection, data
storing and data analysis as easy as ever. This “ease of use,” may be manipulated by untrustful
elements, whose aim is to deliberately cause harm by, for example, identifying and exposing sensitive
data. It is the goal of privacy preserving methods to prevent or at least lessen the chances of such
harmful actions from happening. In this paper we present a novel way to achieve the goal when a
certain statistical analysis is required.
Preserving the privacy of individual databases when carrying out statistical calculations has a
long history in statistics and had been the focus of much attention in machine learning, e.g., see [1].
Once data are merged across sources, however, privacy becomes far more complex and a number of
privacy issues arise for the linked individual files that go well beyond those that are considered with
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regard to the data within individual sources. When the goal is the production of the results of some
statistical calculation, such as a regression analysis, c.f. Karr et al. [13, 14], we can often exploit
results from the cryptography literature, borrowing tools such as secure multi-party computation,
e.g., see [16, 20]. Secure multi-party protocols are concerned with distributed computation where
each participating party, holding a private input, learns nothing but the result (see Section 2).
This paper has two main themes. In both themes we conceptualize the existence of a single
combined database containing all of the information for the individuals in the separate databases
and for the union of the variables. We propose an approach that gives full statistical calculation
on this combined database without actually combining information sources, see [15, 16]. We focus
mainly on logistic regression, but our methods and tools are essentially adaptable to other statistical
models, as indicated in Section 8. Our approach provides only the final result of the calculation
compared with other methods that share intermediate values and thus present an opportunity for
compromise of values in the combined database, c.f. [5, 7]. We remark that our problem differs
from the one studied by Chaudhuri and Monteleoni [4] using differential privacy, since they are
concerned with information leakage by the output of the computation, whereas we are concerned
with leakage from the computation itself !
The first theme is the development of a novel approach to perform the calculations required for
fitting logistic regression models when the data are distributed among several parties. In our settings
the parties are unwilling or are simply forbidden (by law regulations) to share their respective data.
They acknowledge the fact that pooling their private data into a conceptual global database, and
running the logistic regression on the pooled data, rather than on their own data, can only lead
to a better statistical analysis. We develop a secure protocol to compute the maximum likelihood
estimates of the logistic parameters. Throughout the paper we make repeated use of what is known
as random secret sharing, which enables us to keep intermediate parameter values secret. The first
theme aims at performing the required calculations by using operations which are restricted to a
linear algebra type. Note that the fitting process requires computing the logistic function which is
highly non-linear. In principle, we may perform any computation securely, by making use of Yao’s
general protocol [21]. Nonetheless, this is in essence a theoretical construction which will often be
inefficient for large computations [20]. Instead, we craft a specially designed approximation to the
logistic function, which can be securely evaluated using the machinery of random shares and Yao’s
millionaire protocol.
We establish the theoretical validity of the secure protocol for computing the logistic parameters,
and show its performances in practice. In high dimensional problems with large number of cases our
protocol may require faster computing resources. This is mainly because our approximation requires
computing the predicate “greater-than,” which may take many encryptions. Indeed, evaluating this
predicate by a reduction to Yao’s protocol takes roughly O(b) encryptions where b is the number
of bits used to represent the numbers (this becomes dauntingly large due to the secret sharing
scheme).
This leads us to the second theme, which tries to amend the protocol is a way that speeds
up the computation of the logistic function. The main idea here is to avoid special circuit sub-
protocols, such as Yao’s protocol. To that end, we show that we can perform the fitting process
using only sums and products. The advantage to this is that these computations are very well
studied primitives in secure multiparty computation and thus we can instantiate our method in a
different secure multiparty computation scheme (e.g., [20, 9]), depending on the security demands
of the data holders. We propose to approximate the vector of logistic function values, by repeatedly
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Taylor expanding around the current value and stepping along the gradient. Operations other than
sums and products, are not needed here. In principle, the approach represents the logistic function
as the solution to a ordinary differential equation, then applies Euler’s method to approximate
the solution. As with the first theme, we show that we can make the approximation arbitrarily
accurate, at the expense of computational efficiency, and we present an illustrative empirical result.
We close the introduction with a brief description of logistic regression, mainly for the purpose
of setting notation. Logistic regression is used for predicting binary outcomes or class membership
given a set of explanatory variables or predictors. We can use the fitted model to predict class
membership for a newly obtained record consisting of only the values of the predictors. The basic
framework of logistic regression treats binary responses y1, . . . , yn as realizations of n independent
Bernoulli random variables, Y1, . . . , Yn, whose mean depends on a set of predictors xi ∈ Rd, as
follows:
EYi = σ(xTi β) , (1)
where σ(a) = (1 + exp(−a))−1, is the sigmoid (or the logistic) function, and β is a d-dimensional
parameter vector. This makes the log odds, log(EYi/(1− EYi)), linear in the predictors.
A standard method for computing the maximum likelihood estimates of β is Newton-Raphson’s
method, since closed form expressions do not exist. The fitting process requires the user to supply
the log-likelihood function associated with logistic regression, along with its first two derivatives.
Suppressing dependence on the data and vector of parameters, we let ` be the log-likelihood, i.e.,
` =
∑
i{yixTi β − log(1 + ex
T
i β)}. We also put on record the first two derivatives:
∇` =
∑
i
{xiyi − xiσ(xTi β)} , ∇2` = −
∑
i
σ(xTi β)(1− σ(xTi β))xixTi . (2)
The gradient and the Hessian are assembled together to produce an estimate of the logistic
parameters through the iterative process:
βt+1 = βt − (∇2`)−1∇` . (3)
Our protocol will be structured in rounds, where each round corresponds to an iteration of Newton’s
method (3) followed by a convergence check. Each round involves a loop through all the cases xi to
compute the contribution to the gradient and Hessian. We keep intermediate values of βt unshared
between the parties. This is made possible by representing βt as random shares (see Section 3).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the multi-party setup.
In section 3 we provide several sub-protocols which we will need. Sections 4 and 5 describe our
protocol and an approach for speeding up the calculation involved, respectively. Section 6 describes
implementation details. Section 7 illustrates aspects of the computation on an extract of data from
the Current Population Survey divided between two parties. Section 8 discusses possible extensions.
We defer all technical details to Appendices A and B.
Setting
We let X denote the n×d design matrix, and y the n-dimensional response vector. We assume the
presence of P ≥ 2 parties who are interested in computing logistic regression on the total of their
data. We suppose that the union of the parties data corresponds to the X and y of the logistic
regression. In particular, we suppose that party j holds onto the pair (Xj , yj) with Xj ∈ Rn×d and
yj ∈ {0, 1}n, where Xj is the jth party design matrix, and yj is her (binary) response vector.
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In this work we consider a setting where each party has an “additive share” of the dataset.
That is,
∑
j Xj = X and
∑
j yj = y where X and y correspond to the design matrix and response
vector of the combined data on which the logistic regression is performed. This subsumes all the
partitioning schemes for the database (e.g., vertical and horizontal partitioning which are the cases
considered in [20]) as in these cases for each element, one party holds the value and the remaining
parties hold zero. Furthermore this setup is applicable in a case where parties may have overlapping
data, and the logistic regression is to be learned by using a linear function of the overlapping data
(e.g., a weighted average) as a kind of measurement error model. We suppose that the union of the
individual data sets gives the complete data. In cases where some data are missing, we can apply
a privacy preserving imputation method such as in Jagannathan and Wright [12] as a preprocess,
and then run our protocol.
We note that our method is general in the sense that it is applicable to every partitioning
scheme, but it is clearly possible to treat specific cases such as vertically partitioned data with
more efficient specialized protocols.
2 Secure Multi-Party Computation
Ideally we would like our method to provide only the output of the calculation to the parties
involved, and reveal nothing more. This is a lofty goal without the aid of trusted third parties,
however it is relaxed in a useful way in the cryptographic literature. First it is assumed that
the parties are not able to quickly solve computationally hard problems (such as breaking RSA
encryption). Then, a protocol is secure so long as intermediate values in the computation either
contain almost no information (in the sense that the protocol would have to be re-run astronomically
many times on the same input data in order to detect any information in the messages), or will
only reveal information as the result of an intractable computation. We now briefly review the
security model we intend to use.
We consider the “functionality” (see [9]) which maps the data of each party into the logistic
regression parameter vector β:
{(X1, y1), (X2, y2), · · · (XP , yP )} → {β, β, · · ·β} (4)
The right hand side represents P copies of the parameter, so that each party receives the same
output. Note that each design matrix is of the same dimensions.
A protocol for computing the functionality is just a sequence of steps, consisting of parties
performing local computations, and sending intermediate messages to each other. In this work we
build up a protocol for computing (4) which is secure in the presence of “semi-honest” parties.
That is, parties who obey the protocol (and do not try to e.g., inject malformed data) but keep a
transcript of all the messages they receive. Intuitively, a protocol is secure in this setting whenever
the intermediate messages give no information about the secret inputs of other parties. Formally,
the “view” of the jth party during the protocol is:
viewj((X1, y1), (X2, y2), · · · (XP , yP )) = {(Xj , yj), r,m1, · · ·m|m|} (5)
where r is a record of all the random draws made by party j, and mk is the k
th message received
by that party (we have dropped dependence of m on j for readability).
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The protocol is secure so long as there exists a polynomial time algorithm which, when given
only the input and output of party j, may output a random transcript of message which is com-
putationally indistinguishable from viewj . See Goldreich [9] for a definition and discussion of com-
putational indistinguishability. In essence, if the distribution of the sequence of messages depends
only on the private input and output of party j then we can simulate messages by drawing from
this distribution (so long as the random number generator returns samples which are computation-
ally indistinguishable from draws from the distribution). The existence of a simulator shows that
intermediate messages do not depend on the private input of other parties, and so the protocol is
secure in the sense that parties gain no more information about each other’s private inputs than
that revealed by the output of the protocol. Note that this type of security is “orthogonal” to that
studied in Chaudhuri and Monteleoni [4], which seeks to prevent leakage of secret information in
the parameter vector.
An example of a protocol which does not achieve this definition of security is one where all
parties send their data to party 1, who computes the parameter locally on the combined data and
then sends it back to all other parties. In this case the messages received by party 1 consist of the
data of other parties, in general it is impossible to simulate these messages given only the input
and output belonging to party 1.
In the next section we present a protocol for performing Newton’s method on the logistic
regression objective in a way which is secure in the presence of semi-honest parties. Our protocol
makes use of a specially designed approximation for the logistic function. Section 5 then describes a
different approximation necessitating the operations of only sums and products, and thus speeding-
up the computations.
Although we propose to use the cryptographic model for security, others exist and deserve a
place in the theory of privacy preserving data analysis. The main alternatives we see are “weak”
security, and perturbation of the data. The former comprises a body of literature summarized
in Vaida et al. [20]. The idea is that by giving weaker privacy guarantees, we can implement
much more efficient protocols. Whether it is acceptable to have this weaker privacy guarantee is
a question which one must consider on a case-by-case basis. Although we describe our protocol in
terms of the cryptographic model, by replacing the primitive operations (in Section 3) with their
weakly-secure counterparts, we convert our protocol into a weakly secure (but also computationally
more efficient) one.
The second alternative is data perturbation or sanitization. The idea would be for each party
to somehow perturb his data until he is happy to release it to the other parties (e.g., through the
addition of random noise). Thereupon the parties would each have a noisy copy of all the data,
and could locally compute whatever statistical method they wanted on the union of the data. The
difficulty with this approach is that to protect privacy may require the addition of noise of such
amplitude as to render the data itself useless.
3 Primitives for Secure Protocols
In this section we lay out some primitives and sub-protocols which we will commbine to make a
full logistic regression protocol. While, details of the implementation of these primitives are in the
references cited, we also include some in the appendix.
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3.1 Secret Sharing
In our construction we make extensive use of additive secret sharing. The idea is to divide a
quantity of interest a into P random numbers aj (one for each party) so that
∑
j aj = a. If the aj
are distributed uniformly in the field (e.g., the entirety of R) then any subset of the aj will reveal
nothing about a. In fact the sum over any subset is a random variable, the distribution of which
does not depend on the secret value.
We use this construction to keep all intermediate quantities secret during the evaluation of
Newton’s method (i.e., the gradient, Hessian and intermediate parameter vectors). As long as we
can construct sub-protocols which compute random shares of a quantity, from random shares of
inputs, then we can compose these sub-protocols together to finally obtain random shares of the
logistic regression estimate. With these in hand the parties can then exchange shares and reveal
the vector itself.
Although the joint distribution of the aj concentrates on the linear subspace corresponding to
the secret value, marginally the shares are uniformly distributed and do not depend on any param-
eters. Hence we can easily simulate messages based on these shares since the marginal distributions
are known, and we achieve security as defined in Section 2 . Next we show how to compute additive
shares of all the intermediate quantities using the abstract definition of additive shares. Although
this approach is intuitively appealing, computers would quickly run into problems representing
samples drawn uniformly from R. Therefore, in the appendix we show how to approximate arbi-
trarily well the same computations in modular arithmetic on ZB = {0, 1, · · ·B − 1} for some large
B.
3.2 Computing Sums and Products with Random Shares
To implement Newton’s method we must essentially perform linear algebraic operations on random
shares, for example by computing shares of the Newton step from shares of the gradient and inverse
Hessian. In this section we describe how to obtain random shares of sums and products of quantities
that are themselves represented as random shares. Using these constructions, we compute inner
and outer products of vectors of random shares, and hence also matrix multiplies.
Computing shares of the sum of two secret quantities a =
∑
j aj and b =
∑
j bj is direct, as it
involves only the local computation aj + bj for each party j = 1, . . . , P . That is, party j simply
adds his shares aj and bj together to get a random share of the quantity a+ b. Obtaining random
shares of the product of two secret quantities is more involved:
ab =
∑
j
aj
∑
k
bk =
∑
j
ajbj +
∑
j
∑
k 6=j
ajbk
The elements of the first sum on the right hand side can be computed locally by each party. The
second (double) sum, however, requires products between random shares held by different parties.
To obtain these terms while maintaining the security of the protocol, we turn to oblivious function
evaluation. That is, we pose the problem of computing the product as evaluating a function so that
one party only knows the function and the other party only knows his input and the value of the
function applied to that input.
The function set up by party j and evaluated by party k on his input, bk, is:
f(j→k)(x ; aj) = ajx+ rj,k , (6)
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where rj,k is a quantity generated uniformly at random by party j. Evaluation is done in a manner
so that party j learns nothing of the output (and thus only learns about rj,k which he generated)
and party k learns only the output. Since party k does not know the value of the random variable
rj,k he has learned potentially nothing about the true value of the product. Taking mj,k = −rj,k
and nj,k = f(j→k)(bk ; aj) we have that mj,k +nj,k = ajbk, and thus they form random shares of the
product ajbk.
Once parties compute random shares for all the terms ajbk, they can locally compute random
shares of c = ab as:
cj = ajbj +
∑
k 6=j
(nk,j +mj,k) = ajbj +
∑
k 6=j
(f(k→j)(aj ; bk)− rj,k) . (7)
Summing up these quantities, and utilizing the definition of the linear function set up in (6), we
easily obtain: ∑
j
cj =
∑
j
{
ajbj +
∑
k 6=j
(ajbk + rk,j − rj,k)
}
=
∑
j
aj
∑
k
bk ,
which shows that the cj ’s in (7) are indeed (additive) shares of the product.
This protocol generates random shares of the product even if the original shares weren’t them-
selves random, e.g., if they were due to the partitioning of the data. A method which implements
these encrypted multiplications using fixed-point arithmetic is given in [6].
We also note that dividing one secret value into another securely is much more difficult than
dealing with products and requires more elaborate (and computationally demanding) protocols.
Below we show how matrix inversion can be performed without any divisions.
3.3 Evaluating Interval Membership
We suppose we are able to evaluate the following predicate in a secure way:
1{a ≥ b}
Where a, b are secret values held by separate parties. This is known as Yao’s “millionaires problem,”
since he described it in the context of determining which millionaire has the most money, without
disclosing actual bank balances.
An example of a protocol which computes this predicate is given by Blake and Kolesnikov [2].
We can also trivially extend it so that each party receives a random share of the output bit (i.e.,
each party receives a random bit, the “xor” of which yields the correct output bit). Using this
technique we can also check whether a secret value (i.e., a sum of random shares) is greater or less
than some constant:
1{a1 + a2 ≥ c} = 1{a1 ≥ c− a2}, (8)
where a1, a2 are the random shares of a held by two parties.
3.4 Securely Inverting a Matrix
We use a matrix inversion routine built up entirely of matrix multiplications and subtractions,
thus allowing us to use the constructions of the preceding sections to implement it securely. We
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obtain the reciprocal of a number a without necessitating any actual division by an application
of Newton’s method to the function f(x) = x−1 − a. Iterations follow xs+1 = xs(2 − axs), which
requires multiplication and subtraction only.
It turns out that we can apply the same scheme to matrix inversion, e.g., see [11] and references
therein. A numerically stable, coupled iteration for computing A−1, takes the form:
Xs+1 = 2Xs −XsMs , X0 = c−1I ,
Ms+1 = 2Ms −M2s , M0 = c−1A, (9)
where Ms = XsA, and c is to be chosen by the user. A possible choice, leading to a quadratic
convergence of Xs → A−1 (Ms → I), is c = maxi λi(A). In our actual implementation we used
instead the trace (which dominates the largest eigenvalue, as the matrix in question is positive
definite), since we can compute shares of the trace from shares of the matrix locally by each party.
To compute c−1 we use the same iteration, with scalars instead of matrices. For this iteration we
initialize with an arbitrarily small  > 0 (as convergence depends on the magnitude of the initial
value being lower than that of the inverse we compute). We use the constructions of section 3.2
to iterate through (9) until convergence. As Ms → I, we check for convergence by considering the
absolute difference between the trace of Ms and the data dimension d, and we can evaluate the
function 1{|tr(Ms)− d| > } on random shares of the trace of Ms using the same form as (8).
4 First Protocol for Logistic Regression
We recall the usual Newton-Raphson iteration expression (3). To perform the iteration we first
compute random shares of the update direction: ∆t = −(∇2`(βt))−1∇`(βt), via the formulation
of matrix-vector products of random shares. We can then add these random shares to the current
parameters βt to obtain random shares of βt+1. To check convergence recall (from e.g., [3]) we
should end if:
λ2 = (∇`(βt))T∆t ≤  . (10)
We can compute (10) securely using the same form as (8). The result is sharable among all the
parties, and the protocol ends whenever the result is 0, i.e., when λ2 is not greater than .
By using the constructions of the previous section, we have the tools required to invert shares
of the Hessian, and thus to compute the Newton step. All that we need to do is construct a secure
protocol to evaluate the logistic (sigmoid) function. In principle, a specialized sub-protocol could
be built up using the construction of Yao [21]. The method would be to construct circuit that
evaluates the sigmoid function in the same manner that the arithmetic logic unit in a CPU would.
Then we could give this circuit the secure treatment and make it into a protocol following Goldreich
[9]. The disadvantage with this approach is that the circuit evaluation protocols are prohibitively
expensive and thus they are not useful in practice except for trivial circuits, see e.g., Malkhi et al.
[17]. Instead we use a specially crafted approximation to the logistic function in terms of indicator
functions. We describe this next.
4.1 A Secure Approximation to the Logistic Function
The logistic function itself is the CDF of the logistic distribution. We propose to approximate this
function with an “empirical CDF.” This is a function of a set of L samples zl, taken independently
from a logistic distribution:
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σ(a) ≈ FL(a) = L−1
L∑
l=1
1{a ≥ zl} . (11)
Based on the Glivenko-Cantelli theorem, and later work by Dvoretzky, Kiefer and Wolfowitz,
the rate at which the empirical CDF converges to the true CDF (i.e., the logistic function which is
of interest) is known. Using these results, we obtain bounds on the maximum difference between
the logistic function and our approximation, which hold with high probability. See the remark
below in Section 4.2 about the accuracy of the approximation.
We now turn attention to obtaining random shares of the logistic function evaluated at random
shares of βTxi. We obtain random shares of β
Txi by using the inner product construction for
multiplying together random shares. If we denote shares of this inner product by (βTxi)j for party
j, we write:
σ(βTxi) ≈ L−1
∑
l
1{βTxi ≥ zl} = L−1
∑
l
1{(βTxi)1 + (βTxi)2 ≥ zl} . (12)
Thus the problem reduces to getting random shares of the sum of indicators. Note that we can
re-write each indicator function as:
1{(βTxi)1 + (βTxi)2 ≥ zl} = 1{(βTxi)1 ≥ zl − (βTxi)2} . (13)
If party 2 generates the logistic random variables then we have a trivial reduction to (8). In order
to restrict the view of either party to a random share, we restrict the output to random bits ol1,
and ol2, such that
ol1 ⊕ ol2 =
{
1 if 1{a ≥ zl}
0 otherwise
,
where ⊕ is the exclusive or. The right-hand side of equation (12) requires (random shares of) the
fraction of outputs with ol1 ⊕ ol2 = 1. This can be established by noticing that
L∑
l=1
(ol1 ⊕ ol2) =
L∑
l=1
ol1 +
L∑
l=1
ol2 − 2oT1 o2 ,
where we denote ok = (o
1
k, . . . , o
L
k ) for k = 1, 2. Jagannathan and Wright [12] use this method to
convert xor shares into additive shares for a different privacy-preserving task.
In order for the output to behave this way, we can either use Yao’s protocol directly, or take a
(more efficient) GT protocol and modify it to give a (xor) random share. In this work we use the
protocol of Blake and Kolesnikov [2]. Having computed random shares of the logistic function, we
can use the constructions of Section 3.2 to compute random shares of the gradient and Hessian,
and hence build a full logistic regression protocol.
4.2 Quality of the Logistic Approximation
A comment about the accuracy of approximation (11), and the resulting logistic parameter es-
timator is in order. The tail behavior of the sup-norm of the error is given, for every  > 0,
by:
P
(∥∥σ(·)− L−1 L∑
l=1
1{· ≥ zl}
∥∥
∞ > 
)
≤ 2e−2L2 , (14)
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known as the Dvoretzky-Kiefer-Wolfowitz (DKW) inequality. One possible way to choose the
number of Logistic variables L in practice, is by ensuring that the above probability is no more
than a prescribed level of accuracy, say α. Solving for L we obtain the (very conservative) bound
L ≥ −12−2 log(α/2). A less conservative bound might entail the maximum absolute error restricted
to some interval (containing the origin).
We relate error in the approximation of the sigmoid (and hence the gradient) to the error in
the convergent parameter by the following inequality:
||βˆ − β||2 ≤ R[L
−1 + ‖σ(·)− FL(·)‖∞]
λˆmin
, (15)
in which βˆ is the optimizer of the exact log likelihood, and β is the optimizer of our approximation,
λˆmin is the smallest eigenvalue of the Fisher information matrix I(β) = −n−1∇2`(β) (on some
interval, see Appendix A), and R is the radius of a ball which containing all the data vectors (i.e.,
∀i, ||xi||2 ≤ R). The proof of this inequality follows lemma 1 of [4] in which the two convex func-
tions are the exact log likelihood objective, and the difference between the exact and approximate
objectives. See Appendix A for detailed theoretical derivation.
Since we can use expression (14) to bound the numerator of expression (15), the parameter
output by our protocol, and that output by the exact (non-private) algorithm can be brought
arbitrarily close (except on a set of negligible probability) by increasing the parameter L. Later, we
perform an experiment to show how well the method performs with reasonably small L. Note that
for Newton’s method to converge in this approximation, we must use the same sample of L logistic
random variables each time we approximate the sigmoid. Otherwise assessing convergence would
be difficult as the objective function would be constantly shifting. We propose that the parties
draw L logistic variables ahead of time, and use these for all the computations.
4.3 Hessian Lower Bound Technique
Notice that the Newton Raphson method requires inverting a matrix (the Hessian of the log like-
lihood) at each iteration. In our setting, using our iterative inversion method this becomes very
expensive. Therefore we propose to use a well-studied approximation [18], which replaces the
iteration by:
βt+1 = βt − 4(XTX)−1∇` . (16)
First note that under this technique the algorithm only ever needs a single matrix inversion, since
XTX is constant throughout all the iterations. Second, this algorithm still eventually converges
to the correct parameter value (modulo the other approximations we make in our protocol). The
reason is that the inverse hessian is always greater than 4(XTX)−1, in the sense that the difference
is positive semi-definite, see e.g, Minka [18] for more details. What’s more, this technique ensures
that progress towards the optimum is monotonic, and so assessing convergence may be simpler.
4.4 Computation and Communication Complexity
First we count how many times we must run each of our primitives for each iteration of Newton’s
method. The approximation of section 4.1 requires nL instances of the GT protocol per round, as
L instances are required per case. Computing the gradient and the Hessian requires n(1 + d+ d2)
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multiplications. Inverting the Hessian takes 2d3 multiplies and one GT per iteration of (9). Since
this inner iteration is quadratically convergent, it takes O(log d) iterations to converge, and thus
takes O(d3 log d) multiplies and O(log d) instances of GT. In total then, each outer iteration takes
O(nd2 + d3 log d) multiplies, and nL+O(log d) invocations of the GT protocol.
Each multiplication requires a number of encryptions and decryptions; this scales quadratically
with the number of parties P since they must exchange with one another. Thus the computational
workload increases as the data are split into more pieces. Note that although repeated use of the
cryptosystem is quite expensive, performance on normal hardware is relatively rapid. A machine
dedicated to the computation and running multiple threads can do thousands of encryptions per
second.
Each instance of GT using the protocol of [2] requires O(logB) encryptions and decryptions
(and operations on encrypted values etc.). Therefore in total our approximation of section 4.1
requires O(nL logB) encryptions per iteration. This may be too computationally demanding for
large L. One way to reduce this cost is to run the scheme using a coarse approximation to the
sigmoid (i.e., a small L) to convergence, then increase L, resample the logistic variables and then
continue Newton’s method from the previous convergent parameter. Although the latter iterations
will still be computationally burdensome, there will be fewer of them. Another way is to use a
different approximation to the sigmoid function. This is outlined next in Section 5.
Note that the total amount of communication by all parties is also proportional to the number
of multiples and GT invocations. For an invocation of either, a party must transmit logN bits to
another party, and then receive a message of the same length. There are a total of O(P 2(nd2 +
d3 log d) + nL) messages which must be sent for each iteration. If the number of parties or cases,
or the granularity of the approximation is large, running the protocol over a high speed local area
network would make the communication overhead manageable.
5 Second Protocol for Logistic Regression
As we mentioned above, the computation complexity of evaluating approximation (11) to the
logistic function scales linearly with L, since on each of Newton’s iteration we invoke Yao’s protocol
to compute the GT predicate, and we do it for every case i. This may be prohibitively expensive
even for a moderate L. A possible way to reduce this computational burden was briefly described
in Section 4.4. Here, we provide full details of a more structured approach, which is reminiscent
of Euler’s method. The approach is built (again) on computing Newton’s iteration (3). It would
be more natural in this section to treat the logistic function in a vectorized fashion, i.e., σ(a) =
(σ(a1), . . . , σ(an)), for an n-dimensional vector a = (a1, . . . , an). Therefore, we use different, albeit
equivalent, representations for the gradient and Hessian:
∇` = XT {y − σ(Xβ)} , ∇2` = −XTdiag{σ(Xβ) ◦ (1− σ(Xβ))}X . (17)
Here X is the design matrix whose rows are xTi , the units or feature vectors (see (2)). The symbol
“◦” denotes the element-wise product, i.e., u ◦ v = v ◦ u = diag(u)v.
We modify the iteration so that we neither explicitly compute the logistic function σ(·) which
is involved in both the gradient and Hessian, nor use the approximation in expression (11). Note
that throughout the procedure we may treat each unit xi as having an associated logistic function
value σ(βTt xi). We propose to track a vector of approximate function values σˆt ≈ σ(Xβt) which
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will be updated after each iteration. Then, these approximate values will be used to compute the
next iteration of βt. Note that the derivative of the logistic function is given by:
σ′(a) = σ(a)(1− σ(a)) def= g(σ(a)) . (18)
Therefore, knowing the value σ(a), we can determine the derivative of the logistic function around
a by a single multiplication. Linearizing around some value a0 gives:
σ(a) = σ(a0) + (a− a0)g(σ(a0)) + 2−1(a− a0)2σ′′(·)
∣∣
a?
≈ σ(a0) + (a− a0)g(σ(a0)) , (19)
where the second derivative is evaluated at some value a? in the interval between a and a0. Denote
by ∆t = βt+1 − βt as in Section 4, then may make use of the approximation:
σˆt+1 = σˆt + (X∆t) ◦ g(σˆt) , (20)
where g is applied element-wise to σˆt.
Over the course of the entire algorithm, the approximation σˆt is updated repeatedly, in a manner
very similar to using Euler’s method to numerically integrate the differential equation (18). It is well
known that the error of this method decreases with the size of the “step” taken at each iteration.
In the above, the steps are of size X∆t, which will in general be different on each iteration, and
will also be different for each unit. In order to control the error we amend this approximation by
breaking down the step into k smaller steps each of size k−1X∆t, and performing k such updates.
As we shall see, we may base our choice of k on some aspect of the design matrix, X, in order to
reach a desired level of error in the approximation. We write this approximation as:
σˆt+1 = σˆt + k
−1X∆t ◦
k∑
i=1
g(σˆ?i )
def
= σˆt +X∆t ◦ g˜k(σˆt, X∆t) , (21)
where the σˆ?i are the intermediate values corresponding to the inner iterations, and we define g˜k as
the function which gives the average value of g evaluated on these values.
We summarize our method in the following coupled iteration:
β0 = 0
d×1
σˆ0 = 2
−1 · 1n×1
∆t = 4(X
TX)−1XT (y − σˆt) (22)
βt+1 = βt + ∆t
σˆt+1 = σˆt +X∆t ◦ g˜k(σˆt, X∆t) ,
where 0d×1 is the d-dimensional vector of zeros and 1n×1 is the n-dimensional vector of ones. The
proposed iteration differs from the protocol of Section 4 (and from the usual Newton-Raphson
method). The main difference is that we have replaced the logistic function approximation (11)
with our Taylor approximation. Note that we are using again the bound on the Hessian (see Section
4.3), which would make computation easier. We use this technique in our method for this reason,
and also since it interacts well with our Taylor approximation by ensuring that convergence towards
the optimum is in a sense monotonic, as shown in Section B.1. In keeping with our goal of using
only sums and products, we recall that it is possible to invert a matrix with just these operations
(see Section 3.4).
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We now present a bound on the distance from our approximated regression coefficients βt, to
the true optimizer of the log-likelihood which we denote by βˆ, as in (15). Since our iterations are
guaranteed to converge (see Section B.1), we can choose to run the iterations until ||XT (y − σt)||2
is smaller than some threshold b (i.e., by choosing t accordingly):
b ≥ ||XT (y − σˆt)||2 ≥ ||XT (y − σt)||2 − ||XT (σˆt − σt)||2 .
Therefore we can bound the norm of the gradient of the logistic log-likelihood taken at our final
parameter estimate:
||∇`(βt)||22 ≤ b+ nRcτ .
where R is the radius of a ball containing all the data vectors, exactly as in (15), c is some constant,
and τ is a quantity upper bounding the maximal Euler’s step size.
We can use this to construct our main result about the quality of our approximation. Suppose
we choose b ≤ nRcτ , then from the above we have:
||βt − βˆ||2 ≤ 2Rcτ
λˆmin
, (23)
where λˆmin is the smallest eigenvalue of the Fisher information matrix I(·) = −n−1∇2`(·) in the
line segment between β and βˆ. Note that λˆmin = n
−1λmin and the factors of n cancel.
Therefore we can make the accuracy of our approximation arbitrarily good by decreasing τ
although, as we shall see there is a tradeoff involved. A smaller τ usually means a higher k,
resulting in increased computational demands. We refer the reader to Appendix B for complete
technical details.
5.1 Choice of k
Thus far we have that the error of the approximation decreases as τ is decreased; however, this last
variable is not controlled directly (as L was in protocol 1) but rather is a function of k, the number
of steps taken for each outer iteration of the algorithm.
In principle, to get at a prescribed step size τ , we can choose k by noting that:
τ ≤ ||k−1X∆t||∞ ≤ k−1||X(XTX)−1X(y − σˆt)||2 ≤ k−1
√
n (24)
This leads to the overly conservative choice of k = τ−1
√
n. An alternative choice is to run the
protocol with a small value of k, e.g., 10, and then to re-run with different values to assess the
sensitivity of the computation. In Section 7 we show that this technique performs wekk even with
small k.
5.2 Computational Complexity
We can measure the overall complexity of our method in terms of the number of products that are
needed, since these are the most time-consuming operations we use. First note that to construct
the matrix XTX takes nd2 products, and inversion of this matrix takes O(d3) using (9), where the
constant is related to the condition of the matrix. Then on each iteration, to compute ∆t takes
nd + d2 products. Our approximation to the logistic function takes nk products, for a total of
n(k + d) + d2 products per iteration.
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We compare this with the cost of a protocol which computes the logistic function via a specially
designed sub protocol based on circuit evaluation, cf. Yao [21]. If the latter may be evalutated using
q encryptions, then the complexity would be n(d+ q) + d2 operations per iteration. As mentioned
before this number would typically be much larger than k (for example on the order of the number
of bits used to represent the numbers). Therefore on each iteration we can save a multiple of n
operations, which may be especially important when n is large.
6 Security Guarantees
Since our protocol runs until convergence, the number of rounds is variable and depends on the data
itself. Furthermore a matrix inversion was performed by an iterative scheme which itself took some
variable number of iterations to converge. Therefore we amend the protocol so that the output for
each party is a triple consisting of the convergent parameter value, and the number of iterations
it took to converge, and the number of iterations taken for the matrix inversion. This way the
messages received from testing convergence are easily simulated (i.e. a zero on every round up until
the number specified in the output, then a one on that iteration) and this clearly reveals no more
information since the parties know “where they are” in the protocol at all times and could count
these numbers of iterations. Having dealt with this technicality we will consider simulating the
other intermediate messages in our simulator, and consider these convergence tests already taken
care of.
In both of our protocols, the messages which are transmitted are always part of some sub-
protocol, namely multiplication or evaluation of the “greater than” predicate. The only exception
to this is the final messages which are sent immediately before the output is reconstructed. As
those messages are themselves random shares they may be simulated easily (although they must
be simulated in such a way that they sum to the correct output values, but this is trivial). The
messages which are passed during the sub-protocols may be simulated based on their respective
input and outputs so long as the sub-protocols are cryptographically secure. Since we take care
to ensure that the intermediate values are random shares, the simulators for the sub-protocols
“compose” to form a simulator for the main protocol (see [9]).
7 Illustrative Experiments
We provide two illustrative experiments to demonstrate our approach. The first aims at showing
the performance of our protocol from Section 4. Specifically, we examine the effect of approximation
(11) on the resulting parameter values, when small, and large number of logistic variables L are
being used. The second example takes a look at the altered protocol from Section 5, which uses
the coupled iteration (22) instead of approximation (11), and reports its performances for different
values of k, the number of Euler’s “steps”.
For both experiments we use an extract from the Current Population Survey (CPS) data (see
http://www.bls.gov/cps/), which includes data on a sample of slightly more than 50,000 U.S.
households. We focus on predicting whether household income is greater than 50,000 dollars. We
converted M -category features into M − 1 binary features, and divided age into 4 bins correspond-
ing to 20 year intervals. Note that although we expressed our approach in terms of continuous
covariates, it handles binary flags just as well, where said covariates take on e.g., 0.0 and 1.0.
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Our protocol from Section 4 deviates from the exact computation in two ways, first we use an
approximation to the gradient, and second we perform all the calculations in fixed-point arithmetic.
Both of these approximations can be made arbitrarily tight but at the expense of computational
efficiency. To demonstrate that our protocol can be implemented in an efficient manner and produce
reasonably accurate results we implemented it in a simulator and compared the results to exact
logistic regression on the CPS data.
For each of L = 100 and L = 500 we ran our first protocol 100 times. The table below shows the
means and standard deviations of the resulting parameter values. Evidently, as L gets bigger, the
accuracy of the parameter values improves. Figures 1 and 2 show how the likelihood of the estimate
maintained by the protocol increases with the number of iterations. We computed the error bars
by removing the 5 samples that deviated from the mean by the greatest amount, and plotting
the minimum and maximum from the remaining ones. This then corresponds to an approximate
95% confidence interval, and would become an exact interval if we were to perform more and
more simulations. For the purposes of comparison, we also plotted the likelihood achieved by the
exact non-private Newton Raphson algorithm, and a non-private algorithm which we referred to
as “hessian lower bound.” Both give upper bounds for what we hope to achieve, the latter is an
algorithm where we just use the approximation of (16), and exact (i.e., non-private) logistic sigmoid
values. We see that as L increases, the first protocol more closely approximates the hessian lower
bound technique, which converges more slowly than the exact Newton Raphson method.
For the second experiment, we ran our coupled iteration on the CPS data with k = 5, 10.
Although each iteration of our algorithm may be cheap, all is for nought if we require many more
iterations for convergence. To determine whether this happens we compared our method to the
Hessian lower bound method of (16), since this represents our algorithm without the approximation.
In figure 3, we plot the likelihoods of the second protocol against the iteration number. Since there
is no randomness in the second approximation, there are no error bars. Even for small values
of k, much smaller than those suggested by (24), the approximation to the Hessian lower bound
technique is quite good, and increasing k further (e.g., to 50) results in curves which are exactly
the same as that of the Hessian lower bound method. In table 1 we show the resulting parameter
estimates for both methods.
8 Beyond Logistic Regression
We can use the construction of Section 4 to build secure protocols for similar statistical calculations,
e.g., the constructions for computing shares of outer products and matrix inverses naturally yield a
secure algorithm for performing linear regression, for details see [6]. Furthermore using the “ridge
regression” penalty on the weights (i.e., computing a MAP estimate under a Gaussian prior) can
naturally be added to the protocol for both linear and logistic regression. It is also possible to
implement the coordinate ascent computation of the lasso (or sparse logistic regression) using these
constructions (i.e., using the GT protocol to perform soft thresholding).
Our protocol generalizes to the class of Generalized Linear Models (GLMs) including logistic
regression with other link functions. GLMs consist of a random component Yi from an exponential
family, a systematic component with a linear predictor ηi = x
T
i β, and a link function ηi = h(µi),
where µi = EYi. If h makes the linear predictor ηi = θi, where θi is the natural parameter of the
exponential family, h is canonical.
For Poisson log-linear models with the canonical link, µi = exp{ηi}, we approximate the ex-
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NR P1, L = 100 s.d. P1, L = 500 s.d. P2, k = 5 P2, k = 10
Intercept -10.7536 -11.6306 1.0761 -11.5732 0.5339 -10.7944 -11.2262
Child Sup 0.0002 0.0002 0 0.0002 0 0.0002 0.0002
Property Tax 0.0003 0.0003 0 0.0003 0 0.0003 0.0003
Num in Household 0.9802 0.9916 0.0863 0.9881 0.0434 0.9259 0.9601
Num Children -1.056 -1.0721 0.0935 -1.0685 0.047 -1.0017 -1.0384
Num Married 0.0342 0.0343 0.0053 0.0343 0.0022 0.032 0.0333
Child Sup Ind. -0.0001 -0.0001 0 -0.0001 0 -0.0001 -0.0001
Education 0.3218 0.3276 0.0295 0.3265 0.0146 0.3058 0.3172
Age
-4.6178 -3.9701 0.3451 -3.94 0.1638 -3.6202 -3.8011
-4.2368 -3.6782 0.3148 -3.6596 0.1504 -3.4817 -3.5823
-3.9608 -3.3355 0.2852 -3.3157 0.135 -3.1592 -3.2481
-4.9575 -4.4069 0.3795 -4.3814 0.1829 -4.1096 -4.2624
Marital Status
0.0064 0.0051 0.0282 0.0001 0.012 -0.0035 -0.0007
-0.5362 -0.5623 0.058 -0.5562 0.0279 -0.5205 -0.5404
-0.4378 -0.4718 0.0819 -0.4609 0.0374 -0.3934 -0.4321
-0.5855 -0.6096 0.0675 -0.6018 0.0309 -0.572 -0.5889
-0.9617 -1.0283 0.1146 -1.0116 0.0549 -0.957 -0.9874
-0.7496 -0.7888 0.0852 -0.7783 0.0401 -0.736 -0.7598
-
Race
0.2417 -0.2588 0.0276 -0.2565 0.0135 -0.2401 -0.2491
-0.4981 -0.5167 0.05 -0.5128 0.0244 -0.4835 -0.4997
-0.1658 -0.1796 0.0196 -0.1785 0.0102 -0.1631 -0.1719
Sex -0.2763 -0.2802 0.0244 -0.2792 0.0125 -0.2613 -0.2712
Table 1: Estimates produced by the exact method (Newton Raphson), and the two protocols, for
different parameter settings of the protocols.
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ponential function similarly. For Gamma models with the canonical link, µi = 1/ηi, and for
inverse-Gaussian models with the canonical link, 1/µ2, we can use the number inverting without
division scheme. Our approach can also be extended to treat binary regression with non-canonical
links, such as the probit link function, or more generally, inverse CDF link functions. The general
form of the gradient is:
∇` =
∑
i
{yixi − xiµi}
Var(Yi)
∂µi
∂ηi
. (25)
Let F denote a given CDF (F = Φ leads to the probit link function, while, of course, F = FL leads
to the logit link function). Then, µi = F (ηi), and thus ∂µi/∂ηi = f(ηi), where f is the density.
Therefore, we should find approximations for f as well as for F (approximation for F will follow
the same idea as for FL, i.e., using the empirical CDF).
9 Conclusion
We have demonstrated that a fully secure approach to logistic regression based on the cryptographic
notion of security may be made practical for use on moderately large datasets shared between several
parties. Although it is slower than methods with weaker security guarantees, it offers more rigorous
guarantees with respect to the privacy of the input data. We emphasize that our protocol (like
any cryptographic protocol) prevents leakage of information which may arise from the computation
itself. It does not address any leakage which results from the output.
The problem of secure regression is far from solved however, we have yet to deal with the
problem of record linkage, and have implicity assumed that the parties know how their respective
datasets are aligned. Furthermore record linkage due to a statistical model may be incorrect and
may result in errorful estimates of model parameters.
A Theoretical Validity of the First Protocol
Here we show how a bound on the error in the approximation (11) to the logistic function leads
to a bound on the quality of the convergent parameter vector output by the protocol. Specifically,
we establish the validity of (15). Let R denote a constant such that ||xi||2 ≤ R, for i = 1, . . . , n.
Recall the expressions for the gradient ∇` and Hessian ∇2` given in (2). Define the approximated
gradient, by substituting FL for σ:
∇˜`(β) =
n∑
i=1
xiyi − xiFL(xTi β) . (26)
Rewriting ∇`(β) = ∇˜`(β) +∑ni=1 xiFL(xTi β)− xiσ(xTi β), and applying the triangle inequality we
obtain a bound on the norm of the gradient of the logistic objective:
||∇`(β)||2 ≤ ||∇˜`(β)||2 + nR||FL(·)− σ(·)||∞ . (27)
Next we convert a bound in the norm of the gradient into a bound on the distance to the optimum.
Lemma A.1. Let βˆ be the optimizer of the logistic regression objective, and let λmin denote the
smallest eigenvalue of the negative Hessian in the line segment between β and βˆ. Then:
||β − βˆ||2 ≤ ||∇`(β)||2
λmin
. (28)
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Proof. We use the mean-value theorem (for vector-valued functions) to write the difference between
gradient vectors at β and βˆ:
∇`(β)−∇`(βˆ) = ∇`(β)− 0 =
(∫ 1
0
∇2`(aβ + (1− a)βˆ) da
)
(β − βˆ) . (29)
Now, for every (symmetric) matrix B, and a non-zero vector e, the Rayleigh quotient satisfies
eTBe/eT e ≥ λmin(B), where λmin(B) is the minimal eigenvalue of B. If B = A2, for a posi-
tive definite (symmetric) matrix A, this reduces (after taking the square root on both sides) to
‖Ae‖2/‖e‖2 ≥ λmin(A). Applying this to (29), and using Weyl’s inequality, we have:
||∇`(β)||2 =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣(∫ 1
0
∇2(aβ + (1− a)βˆ) da
)
(β − βˆ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
≥ λmin||β − βˆ||2 . (30)
This completes the proof.
Lemma A.2. Using the same notation we have:
min
β∈B
||∇˜`(β)||2 ≤ nRL−1 , (31)
where B is a (non-empty) set of logistic parameters defined in the proof.
Proof. Consider a continuous, monotonically non-decreasing function g(·) which satisfies ||g(·) −
FL(·)||∞ ≤ L−1. Such a function clearly exists, for example the smooth nondecreasing curve which
goes through all points (z(j), jL
−1) where 1 ≤ j ≤ L (where z(j) is jth smallest logistic variable
used in FL). Since g(·) is nondecreasing, it is the derivative of some convex function:
G(a) =
∫ a
−∞
g(b) db (32)
Consider the approximation to the logistic gradient which uses g instead of FL:
∇¯`(β) =
n∑
i=1
xiyi − xig(xTi β) (33)
This is the derivative of a concave function:
¯`(β) =
n∑
i=1
xTi βyi −G(xTi β) , (34)
which is indeed concave since it is a linear function minus a convex function. Hence ¯` has a unique
maximum somewhere. Consider the functions g(·) so that the maximum is in the interior of the
space Rd (i.e., is not at infinity). Hence for each such g we have a point β¯ ∈ Rd where the gradient
is zero, i.e., ∇¯`(β¯) = 0. Denote the set of such β¯ by B, and note that B is not empty. An argument
similar to the one that led to (27) shows that:
||∇˜`(β)||2 = ||∇¯`(β) +
n∑
i=1
xig(x
T
i β)− xiFL(xTi β)||2 ≤ ||∇¯`(β)||2 + nRL−1 . (35)
Therefore:
||∇˜`(β¯)||2 ≤ ||∇¯`(β¯)||2 + nRL−1 = nRL−1 , (36)
which completes the proof.
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We now put this all together and state the main result about our approximation FL.
Lemma A.3. If our approximation ∇˜` is used as an approximation to the gradient of the logistic
log likelihood, and numerical optimization is performed until ||∇˜`(β)||2 ≤ nRL−1, then:
||β − βˆ||2 ≤ R(L
−1 + ||FL(·)− σ(·)||∞)
λˆmin
, (37)
where βˆ is the optimizer of the exact logistic regression objective, β is the result of our numerical
optimization, R is the radius of a ball containing all the xi, and λˆmin is the smallest eigenvalue of
the Fisher information matrix I(·) = −n−1∇2`(·) in the line segment between β and βˆ.
Proof. Notice that ||∇˜`(β)||2 ≤ nRL−1 is guaranteed in light of Lemma A.2. The proof follows by
substituting (27) into (28), and by noticing that λˆmin = n
−1λmin and the factors of n cancel.
B Theoretical Validity of the Coupled Iteration
Here we establish the convergence of the coupled iteration (22), and the error in our Taylor ap-
proximation of the logistic function.
B.1 Monotonicity and Convergence
We show that the update described in (22) converges monotonically towards some final value β.
We relate the size of the step taken at one iteration to the size of the step in the previous iteration.
We aim to show that first, these steps are always in the same directions for each unit, and secondly,
the steps are monotonically decreasing and eventually the iterations converge.
Lemma B.1. X∆t+1 element-wise has the same sign as X∆t, in the sense that X∆t+1 ◦X∆t ≥ 0.
Proof. If we define the idempotent matrix M = X(XTX)−1XT , then we write:
X∆t+1 = 4X(X
TX)−1X(y − σˆt)
= 4M(y − σˆt)
= 4M [y − σˆt−1 − (X∆t) ◦ g˜k(σˆt−1)]
= 4MM(y − σˆt−1)− 16M diag (g˜k(σˆt−1))M(y − σˆt−1)
= 4M diag (1− 4g˜k(σˆt−1))M(y − σˆt−1)
= M diag (1− 4g˜k(σˆt−1))X∆t , (38)
where we made use of the idempotency of M . Next considering the element-wise product as the
diagonal of the outer product of these two matrices,
X∆t+1(X∆t)
T = M diag (1− 4g˜k(σˆt−1))X∆t∆Tt XT
Since we clearly have that 1 − 4g˜k(σˆt−1) > 0 no matter what value σˆt−1 takes (due to the
definition of gk), we have that this matrix is the product of positive semi-definite matrices, and
therefore is itself positive semi-definite. Therefore the diagonal elements are all non-negative, and
we have proved the claim.
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This result allows us to analyze our approximation to the logistic function as though we were
using the forwards Euler method to integrate the differential equation (18), since all the steps for
any particular unit will be in the same direction.
Lemma B.2. As long as each step k−1|X∆t| ≤ τ < 1 (where the inequality is element-wise), then
0 < σˆt < 1, ∀t (i.e., the approximate logistic values will remain between 0 and 1).
Proof. Suppose that the step is positive for all units and σˆt < 1, then:
σˆt+1 − σˆt ≤ τ σˆt(1− σˆ2t ) < 1− σˆt ,
so we also have that σˆt+1 < 1. Likewise for units which are involved in a negative step, if they are
greater than 0, then they remain so into the next iteration by an argument which is symmetric to
the one above. Therefore we have that our logistic values never leave the interval (0, 1).
With this we also have that 0 < 4g˜k(σˆt) < 1 for all t, from the definition of g and g˜k. Substitution
into (38), yields that:
||X∆t+1||2 ≤ ||M ||2 ||diag (1− 4g˜k(σˆt−1))||2 ||X∆t||2 < ||X∆t||2 , (39)
since M has eigenvalues which are each either 0 or 1. This shows that the magnitude of the
steps for the individual units is shrinking towards zero. Therefore we conclude that eventually, our
approximations of the logistic values stop updating. If we assume that X has d linearly independent
columns, then this also implies that ∆t is going towards zero, and therefore our algorithm eventually
converges.
B.2 Quality of the Logistic Approximation
We now analyze the error in the approximation of the logistic function values. We then use this
together with the convexity of the problem to yield a bound on the error in the convergent pa-
rameters (see (23)). To aid the notation, in this section we consider the problem of estimating the
logistic values for just a single case, and specifically one for which the steps are all positive. Due
to the symmetry of the logistic function about 0, we will then have the same type of bounds on
the error when the approximation updates in the negative direction. We first show a loose upper
bound on the supremum of the error which would be encountered if the approximation was run for
an infinite number of steps of size at most τ , and then use this to bound the error after finitely
many such steps.
As we have shown by the above monotonicity argument, our approximation to the logistic
function is essentially analogous to using Euler’s method to integrate the derivative of the logistic
function. Since we consider approximating a single value, we change the names of our variables to
avoid confusion with the previous vector valued approximation. If we denote by sˆt the approximated
value after t steps of various sizes, τ0 . . . τt−1 < τ . Thus sˆt ≈ st = σ(at) where at =
∑t−1
i=0 τi. We
compare this approximation to the exact values and consider the error:
ξt = sˆt − st .
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Making use of the step (19), we evaluate the error in the next iteration:
ξt+1 = sˆt+1 − st+1
= sˆt + τtg(sˆt)− st − τtg(st)− 2−1τtσ′′(·)|a?t
= ξt + τt[g(sˆt)− g(st)] + ζt
= ξt + τt(sˆt − st)g′(·)|s?t + ζt
= ξt(1 + τtg
′(·)∣∣
s?t
) + ζt
= ξt(1 + τt − 2τts?t ) + ζt
Where we have defined
ζt = −2−1τtσ′′(·)
∣∣
a?t
(40)
and at ≤ a?t ≤ at+1 is some value in the interval about which the second derivative is taken.
Likewise s?t is bounded between st and sˆt. As we have seen from (39), as long as τt ≤ τ < 1 then
0 < sˆt < 1 for all t. Since we only consider positive steps τt > 0 then we have that 2
−1 ≤ sˆt < 1,
and hence the same bound applies to s?t . Therefore we have that:
|ξt+1| ≤ |ξt|+ |ζt|
Therefore we see that:
sup
t
|ξt| ≤
∞∑
i=1
|ζi| (41)
Examining the form of σ′′(·), we find it to be a function which is everywhere negative. Examining
the third derivative, we find that the second derivative has exactly one stationary point in [0,∞)
which is located at:
a? = − log 6−
√
12
6 +
√
12
, σ(a?) =
6 +
√
12
12
Whats more, we see that ∂3σ(·) < 0 on [0, a?), and ∂3σ(·) > 0 on (a?,∞). Therefore we have
that a? is the minimum of the function. Using this we bound the sum (41) by an integral:
−
∞∑
t=0
σ′′(·)|a?t ≤ −
∫ ∞
0
σ′′(a) da− 2τσ′′(x?) = 4−1 − 2τσ′′(x?) .
Substituting this into (41) and (40) we have that:
max
t
|ξt| ≤ 2−1τ(4−1 − 2τσ′′(x?)) def= cτ + dτ2 ≈ cτ . (42)
We can make the approximation arbitrarily tight by decreasing the step size.
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Figure 1: Log Likelihood vs iteration number for protocol 1 with L = 100, and that of the “Hessian
Lower bound” algorithm, which is the same as protocol 1 except with exact sigmoid evaluations.
We also compare to the full newton raphson method, which inverts the hessian on each iteration.
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Figure 2: Log Likelihood vs iteration number for protocol 1 with L = 500, and that of the “Hessian
Lower bound” algorithm, which is the same as protocol 1 except with exact sigmoid evaluations.
We also compare to the full newton raphson method, which inverts the hessian on each iteration.
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Figure 3: Log Likelihood vs iteration number for protocol 2 with k = 5, 10, and that of the “Hessian
Lower bound” algorithm, which is the same as protocol 1 except with exact sigmoid evaluations.
We also compare to the full newton raphson method, which inverts the hessian on each iteration.
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